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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GROVER THOMPSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN E. IIARRis, Warden of _the 
Utah State Penitentiary, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 6655 
Petition For Rehearing 
Comes now Grover Thompson, Plaintiff in the above 
entitled case, and respectfully petitions this Honorable 
Oourt for a rehearing in said case upon the following 
grounds, to-wit : 
(1) The Court erred in holding that plaintiff was 
not denied his liberty without due process of 
law by the trial court, and erred in failing to dis-
charge him from custody upon that ground. 
(2) Even if the plaintiff had received a fair and im-
partial trial in the court below, nevertheless the 
Court erred in failing to hold that the sentence 
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2 
was void and in failing to discharge the plaintiff 
from custody under the sentence. 
DoROTHEA MERRILL DRYER, 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 
Amicus Curiae, by appoint-
ment of the Su;preme Court. 
CERTIFICATE 
I, the undersigned and attorney for plaintiff above 
named, do hereby ·Certify that in my opinion there is good 
reason to helieve that the judgment rendered by this 
Court in this action is erroneous, and that the cause 
should be re-examined. 
DoRoTHEA MERRILL DRYER, 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 
Amicus Curiae, by appoin,t-
ment of the Supreme Court. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR 
REHEARING 
POINT I. 
IT IS SUIB'M:.IT'T'E[) THAT THE COURIT ER!ThEID IN HOLDING 
THkT P:LAIN'l'I•FF WAS NOT DIDNIE.D HIS L1IBERTY WITH· 
OUT DUE PIROCESS OF LAW BY THE T'RIAL OOURT, AND 
IDRRED IN FALLING TO DISCHARGE HIM FROM CUSTODY 
ON THAT GIROUND. 
Provisions safeguarding civil rights thru assertion 
of the right to due process of law appear both in Amend-
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3 
XIV, Section 1, of the Constitution of the United States, 
and in the Constitution of the State of Utah, Article 1, 
Section 7, as follows: 
Constitution of the United States: 
"* * * nor shall any state deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law.'' 
Constitution of the State of Utah: 
''No person· shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, ·without due process of law.'' 
To ascertain the meaning of this guarantee, we must 
look to the case law. In the recent case of Lisenba v. Peo-
ple, 60S. Ct. 280, 314 U.S. 219 (1941), the Supreme Court 
of the United States spoke authoritatively upon the ap-
plication of the concept of due process of law in criminal 
cases. There an accused murderer claimed that confes-
·sions illegally extorted were used in evidence against 
him. The .court, after rejecting his claim, set out the 
test to be followed in these words (at p. 236): 
''The aim of the requirement of due process 
is not to exclude _presumptively false evidence, but 
to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of 
evidence. 
''As applied to a criminal trial, denial of due 
process is the failure to observe that funda!lle~tal 
fairness essential to the very concept of Justice. 
In order to declare a denial of it we must find that 
the absence of that fairness fatally infected the 
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4 
trial; the acts complained of must be of such 
quality as neces,sarily prevents a fair trial.'' 
D1oes the procedure followed by the trial court meet 
this test? We submit that it does not. We submit that 
in the light of this test the proceedings below were char-
acterized by unfairness going to their very heart, were 
fatally infected by unfairness in the use of evidence, and 
that the unfairness was of such quality and significance 
as necessarily to prevent a fair trial. 
In support of this position, there are many cases in 
which proceedings such as those here below have been 
severely censured by learned courts, both English and 
American, over a long period of years. Probably the 
most complete and explicit opinion on this point was writ-
ten by the Connecticut Supren1e Court, speaking unani-
mously, in the case of State v. Ferrone, 113 A. 452, 96 
Conn. 160 (1921). In that case, the defendant was con-
victed of having by night possession of burglar's tools or 
instruments of housebreaking without legal excuse. The 
information had further alleged that ''twice before the 
date of the alleged crime he had been convicted, sen-
tenced, and imprisoned in a state prison.'' The Connecti-
cut Supreme Gourt held that the trial court had properly 
refused to strike out of the information the statements 
relating to former convictions (Connecticut evidently 
having no statute such as Section 105-21-27, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943), but it reversed the decision and ordered 
a new trial because of the manifest unfairness of the p·ro-
ceedings below, saying : 
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"But in State v. Reilly, 94 Conn. 698, we fur-
ther said, on page 705 (110 A. 550, 553) that in 
such an inforrnation 'two separate issues are pre-
sented: First, ·was the defendant guilty of the 
crime charg·ed "? This relates to the crime only. 
Second, if guilty, had the defendant twice before 
been convicted, sentenced and imprisoned'? This 
relates to the penalty only, and does not involve or 
state any other or different crime fron1 that first 
stated. The jury must by their verdict answer 
each of these issues.' This plainly indicates that 
the first issue should be taken up and tried by the 
jury first and separately ; and, if the accused be 
found guilty on this issue·, then the second issue 
should be tried; and, if the accused be found guilty 
on this issue also, then the maximun1 punishment 
prescribed by the statute must be the sentence of 
the court. It cannot be believed that an accu,sed 
man would ever haPe a fair trial, resulting in a 
verdict not affected by prejttdice or by considera-
tions by which the jury should not be influenced, 
if during the trial allegations that he had twice 
before been convicted of state prison crimes have 
been read to the jury, and evidence of his former 
convictions have been· placed before them. It is 
beyond question that knowledge of such facts must 
necessarily prejudice the minds of his triers 
against the a.ccused, and cause him more serious 
injury than that which he would sttff er from any 
improper remarks of the state's attorney. No one 
would claim that in a trial for a specific crime 
evidence of another crime connnitted by the ac-
cused could be admitted for the purpose of prov-
ing his guilt of the crime alleged. The purpose of 
a criminal trial in this state is not more to punish 
the guilty than to discharge the innocent. What-
ever may have been the previous offenses or the 
bad character of the accused, the law surrounds 
him with the presun1ption that he is innocent of 
the specific crime with which he is charged, and, 
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while that presumption has no evidential force, it 
casts upon the state the burden of proving that 
the accused is guilty of that specific crime by evi-
dence of facts material and relevant to that crime. 
State v. Smith, 65 Conn. 283, 31 A. 206. Upon such 
evidence only, the jury are sworn to render their 
verdict. A man is not to be convicted of one crime 
by proof that he is guilty of another. Therefore, 
our law sedulously guards against the introduc-
tion of evidence of any matter immaterial or ir-
relevant to the single issue to be determined. The 
purpose of these salutary laws might often be de-
feated if the minds of the jurors were subjected to . 
the influence of facts or considerations having no 
legitimate bearing on the only question they have 
to decide, and their verdict be reached under the 
impulse of passion, sympathy, or resentment. Such 
a verdict is illegal and could be set aside. The 
rule everywhere enforced excludes not only the 
evidence of another ·crime, but also evidence tend-
ing to degrade the accused, to prejudice the jury 
against him, to divert their minds from the real 
issue which they have to determine, or to persu-
ade them by matters which they have no legal 
right to consider that the accused, for reasons 
other than those based upon legitimate evidence, 
was more likely to have committed the particular 
crime for which he is on trial. 
"As we said .in State Reilly, supra, such an 
information as this presents two separate issues, 
and the issue of former convictions does not relate 
to the issue of the commission of the specific crime 
alleged~ and for which only the accused is to be 
tried, and the fact of former convictions does not 
tend in any way to prove the commission of the 
·crime charged. It follows that, until the verdict 
of the jury on the principal issue has been ren-
dered, no knowledge of the alleged previous con-
victions should reach them, either by reading that 
part of the information in which they are recited 
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or by evidence relating to them. If the verdict 
on the principal issue be guilty, then the second 
issue may be sub1ni tted to the jury. 
"In the absence of statutory regulation in this 
state, it is our opinion that a procedure similar to 
that prescribed by an English statute should be 
followed. 24 and 25 Viet. c. 99, Section 37 ~ Reg. 
v. :Martin, L. R. C. C. 214. The information should 
be divided into two parts. In the first the par-
ticular offense with which the accused is charged 
should be set forth, and this should be upon the 
first page of the information and signed by the 
prosecuting officer. In the second part former con-
victions should be alleged, and thfs should be upon 
the second page of the information, separable 
from the first page and signed by the prosecuting 
officer. The entire information should be read to 
the accused and his plea taken in the absence of 
the jurors. When the jury has been impaneled 
and sworn, the clerk should read to them only that 
part of the information which sets forth the crime 
for which the accused is to be tried. The trial 
should then proceed in every respect as if there 
were no allegations of former convictions, of which 
no mention should be made in the evidence, or in 
the remarks of counsel, or in the charge of the 
court. When the jury retire to consider their ver-
dict, only the first page of the information, on 
which the crime charged is set out, should be given 
to them. If they return a verdict of guilty, the 
second part of the information, in which former 
convictions are alleged, should be read to them 
without reswearing them, and they should be 
charged to inquire on that issue. Of course, the 
accused may plead guilty to this part of the infor-
mation, and then no further proceedings before 
or by the jury would be necessary. No reason ap-
pears why the accused, if he should choose, ~ight 
not submit this issue to the court without the Jury. 
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"In this way the well recognized rights of an 
accused person will be protected, and the prin-
·ciples of justice and our long established laws 
which have been designed to secure an impartial 
trial in every criminal cause will be recognized, 
respected and obeyed. 
"There is error and a new trial is ordered." 
(Italics ours.) 
It may be of interest that upon retrial of the Ferrone 
case, the Connecticut Supreme Court again reversed de-
fendant's conviction, for the reason that the state's attor-
ney persisted in attempting to introduce evidence of the 
prior convictions during the trial of the aceused on the 
main charge. See 116 A. 336, 77 Conn. 258 (1922). In 
State v. Delmonto, 147 A. 825, 110 Oonn. 298 (1929), the 
court followed 'State v. Ferrone, remarking: "We there 
outlined the procedure to be followed in this state in the 
absence of statutory regulation.'' 
The principles enunciated in the Ferrone case ap-
proved in the following cases: State v. Bailey (La.; 1928), 
115 So. 613, at 616, cited in 16 C. J., § 3161, p. 1343; Peo-
ple v. J(ing (lll. ~ 1916), 114 N. E. 601; People v. Kirk-
patrick (Wash.; 135), 43 P. (2d) 45; Robertson v. State 
(1940), 29 AI. 399, 197 So. 73, cert. den. (1940) 240 Ala. 
51, 197 :So. 75, 139 A. L. R. 673, at 686; Lev.ell v. Simpson, 
Warden, 142 Kan. 892, 52 P. (2d) 372, 297 U. S. 695; 
Glover v. Simpson, Warden, 144 Kan. 153, 58 P. (2d) 73, 
299 u. s. 506. 
The most cited English case .on this point, which is 
discussed at length and is the basis for the decision in the 
leading American case of Graham v. West Virginia, 224 
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U. S. 616, 32 S. Ct. 583 (1912), noted in 26 Harvard Law 
Review at page 84, is Regina v. George Shuttleworth, 3 
C. and K. 375, T. and }I. 626, 2 Den. C. C., 351, 5 Cox, 
C. C. 369, 21 L. J., M. C. 36, 15 Jur. 1066, Vol. 2, Mews 
Common Law Digest p. 2386, ( 1851). In that case, the 
prisoner was arraigned on an indictment charging him 
with larceny, and also with having been previously con-
vited of a felony. The reporter's account of the pro-
ceedings is as follows: 
''According to the invariable practice in that 
Court [Sessions for the borough of Manchester], 
before that time, both counts were read to the 
prisoner, and he pleaded not guilty to the whole 
indictment. At the trial, the count for larceny 
only was read by the clerk of the peace to the 
jury, and the witnesses in support of that charge 
were heard, and the jury found the prisoner 
guilty. The clerk of the peace then proceeded to 
read to the jury the further charge, that the pris-
oner had been previously convicted of a felony, 
when the Counsel for the prisoner objected that 
that charge could not be gone into; and he further 
stated that it was his intention, however the Court 
might decide that question, to move in arrest of 
judgment generally. The court proceeded, the 
identity of the prisoner was proved, and the jury 
found prisoner had been previously convicted of 
a felony. Appeal was taken to the Court of 
Criminal Appeal, which held that the sentence. 
under the circumstances was legal. Lord Camp-
bell 'said that the matter admitted of no doubt. 
The prisoner, added his Lordship, is first to be 
arraigned on the whole indictment, including the 
count on the previous conviction: afterwards he 
is to be given in charge to the jury on the crime 
for which he is indicted, only, and the count charg-
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10 
ing a previous conviction is not to be stated to 
the jury till they have given their verdict on the 
subsequent felony. It is also the opinion of all 
the Judges, that it is unnecessary for the jury to 
be sworn again when trying the question. of previ-
ous convictions.' Alderson, B. - That has the full 
concurrence of all the Judges. The practice is 
precisely as it was before.' " [Before 14 and 15 
Viet. c. 19, Section 9; note that this was a five 
judge court.] 
It appears from Wigmore, on ''Evidence,'' 9th Edi-
tion, in Section 194, cited hy this court in its opinion in 
Thompson v. Harris, ---- P. (2d) ____ (1943), that the rule 
of exclusion of evidence of prior convictions was first 
establish~d by the English ·courts, themselves, and was 
in use at least as early as 1684, at Hamden's Trial. Cer-
tainly it is true that this common law rule was in force 
long before the adoption of the Utah Constitution and it 
appears that this con1n1on law rule governed English pro-
cedure long prior to the adoption of the Constitution of 
the United States. 
Section 105-:21-27, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which 
forbids allegations of prior crimes in informations or in-
dictments unless necessary to the main charge, rein-
forces the policy of the common law as to exclusion of 
evidence and goes a considerable step further in protect-
ing the rights of the accused, in that it attempts to render 
impossible even the separable indictment, one part of 
which only could be read to the jury in advance of a ver-
dict of guilty, namely, the part alleging the substantive 
crime. See State v. Ferrone, supra; Regina v. Shu.ttle-
worth, supra. 
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But if Section 105-21-27, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 
were not our statutory law, the common law rule would 
forbid such procedure as was followed below, since the 
common law of England, so far as not repugnant to the 
Constitutions of the United States and of Utah, "shall 
be the rule of decision in all courts of this state.'' See 
Section 88-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943. 
The three leading An1erican cases relating to habit-
ual criminal laws, J.ll oore v. Missouri, 159 U. S. 673 (1895), 
McDonald v. llfassachusetts, 180 U. S. 311, 21 S. Ct. 389, 
45 L. Ed. 542 (1901), and Graham v. West Virginia, 224 
U. 8. 616, 32 S. Ct. 583 (1912), establish generally that 
such laws are valid, per se, and that they do not deprive 
an accused of the equal protection of the laws, put him 
twice in jeopardy, or constitute cruel and unusual punish-
ment. The question of due process of law here involved, 
i.e., the fundamental unfairness of the introduction of 
evidence of prior convictions, was not however, decided 
in these cases. 
In Moore v. Missouri, the pleadings appear to have 
raised this question among others, that ''the indictment 
in charging the former convictions attacked the defend-
ant's character when not in issue.'' The opinion ruled on 
the questions of equal protection, double jeopardy, and 
cruel and unusual punishments, but did not rule on the 
question quoted, and it does not appear from the opinion 
whether the former convictions were presented to the 
jury before or after the verdict on the main offense. 
McDonald v. Massachusetts, which upheld a statute iden-
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tical to ours, ruled on these points and in addition held 
that the statute was not ex post facto, and that no federal 
question was presented by the fact that the judge in-
structed the jury on the habitual criminal charge 
after verdict on the mai:Q offense. And in the lead-
ing, definit\t).,case of GrahaJm. v. West Virginia, the 
court established the rule that a determination as to 
habitual criminality may be made in a subsequent or 
ancillary proceeding. The court relied primarily upon 
Regina v•. Shuttleworth, cited supra, and thereby inferen-
tially approved the rule of exclusion of allegations or 
proof of prior ·crimes before verdict on the main offense. 
Although these cases do not specifically pass on the aspect 
of due process herein presented, they are consistent with 
the common law rule. It is therefore permissible to infer 
that were the question in the instant case presented to 
the United State Supreme Court, it would solemnly frown· 
upon the procedure followed below. \ 
To sum up, the effect of the American and English 
cases, together with the effect of Sections 105-21-27 and. 
105-1-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, is clearly this, that 
the form for charging habitual criminality, set forth in 
Section 105-21-47, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, may be 
properly used only in one of two ways: 
( 1) In a proper case, the indictment, information, or 
other vehicle for charging habitual criminality, 
reciting the fact of three convictions rather than 
combining a recital of two convictions with an 
accusation of a· third crime not yet adjudicated, 
may be submitted to the same jury which tried 
the defendant iipon the substantive crime, once 
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that jury has found the accused guilty of the 
substantive crime, or, 
(2) In a proper case, the vehicle for charging habit-
ual criminality may be used in a proceeding sub-
sequent or ancillary to the trial on the main 
charge. 
Note that it is at the trial for the main offense, only, 
where all the facts requisite to that crime are in issue, 
that the jury's judgment regarding these facts is pre-
judiced by knowledge of prior convictions. Where the 
verdict of guilty of the main crime has been rendered, 
only the question of whether or not the defendant was 
in truth previously convicted would be in issue. Note, 
also, that as practical matter, the use of the subsequent 
or ancillary proceeding would normally be restricted to 
the situation in which the previous crimes were unknown 
to the prosecutor at the time of the trial of the main 
charge. But this is not always so. For example, see the 
case of State v. Smith, 273 P. 323, 128 Ore. 515 (1929), 
which describes the practice under the Oregon statute 
providing for a special supplementary proceeding. 
We should now examine the specific ways in which a 
procedure such as that followed below affects the right of 
an accused to a fair and impartial trial. In this connec-
tion, reference should be made to the information which 
is set out verbatim on page 2 of the first brief in this case. 
It is not a separable information, as required by the 
Ferrone case, and Regina v. Shuttleworth. It accuses 
relator ''of the Crime of RoBBERY AND BEING AN HABITUAL 
CRIMINAL'' and alleges the commissions and convictions 
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of two prior crimes, describing them at length, contrary 
to the specific statutory prohibition of Section 105-21-27, 
Utah Code .Annotated, 1943. That this entire informa-
tion was read to the jury at the commencement of the 
proceedings in the trial court goes without saying. 
Such a procedure has certain obvious effects, which 
hear study: 
FIRsT. The jury is apprised of the previous crimes 
as soon as it has been impaneled. This occurs although 
it is well established that the state cannot, in a criminal 
proceeding, introduce evidence attacking the character 
of the accused, unless the accused first puts his good 
character in issue by introducing evidence to sustain his 
good character or reputation or has become a witness in 
his own behalf. This is true because the ·character of a 
person accused of crime is not a fact in issue on a pro-
secution for such crime. See 20 .Am. J ur. S. 325; Wigmore, 
supra, S:S. 57, 58. 
In the case of State v. Devlin, 258 P. 826, 145 Wash. 
44 (1927), this matter is dealt with explicitly. The court 
there quotes from the opinion in the second Ferrone case: 
'' 'Evidence tending to show the commission 
of other crimes of the part of the accused, or facts 
disclosing his bad character or repute, are not 
rna terial or relevant to the charge against the ac-
cused and should never be permitted to be intro-
duced, for the purpose can be none other than to 
prejudice the jury against the accused, and hence 
to deny him the fair trial which the law guarantees 
him of being proved guilty of the crime with which 
he stands charged by evidence which the law ac-
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cepts. None of the conversations between Higgins 
and the accused was admissible. It was obviously 
intended for the purpose of picturing the accused 
as a notorious crin1inal.' '' 
The opinion continues: 
''The question involved is that of a fair trial, 
a right vouchsafed by the direct written law of 
the people of the state. It partakes of the charac-
ter of fair play, which pervades all the activities 
of the An1erican people whether in their sports, 
business, society, religion, or the law. In the 
maintenance of g·overnment to the extent that it 
is committed to the courts and lawyers in the 
administration of the criminal law it is ju~t as es-
sential that one accused of crime shall have a fair 
trial as it is that he be tried at all, whether he be 
guilty or not, has his picture in the rogues' gallery 
or not.'' 
The court then quotes from Hurd v. People, 25 Mich. 
405 (1872): 
"Unfair means may happen to result in doing 
justice to the prisoner in the particular cases, yet, · 
justice so attained is injust and dangerous to the 
whole community.'' 
In the main, there are two lines of cases which con-
travene or appear to contravene the established rule of 
fairness in the exclusion of evidence immaterial to the 
cause and prejudicial to the accused. The first type is 
illustrated by People v. Sickles, 156 N. Y. 541, 51 N. E. 
288 (1898), noted in 24 L. R. A. N. S. at p. 432, in which 
a strong and well reasoned dissenting opinion was writ-
ten, and Rains v'. State, 142 Neb. 284, 5 N. W. (2d) 887 
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(1942), which is the only case of which we are aware ex-
plicitly holding that a procedure such as that of the trial 
court in the case at bar is not violative of due process 
of law. With the exception of the Rains case, none of 
these cases presents a ruling on the question of due pro-
cess of law here in issue, and the Rains case has several 
peculiarities. The court in that case cites as it authority 
the Nebraska cases of Kwwitzky v. O'Grady, 135 Neb. 
466, 282 N. W. 396, at 399, and Taylor v. State, J14 Neb. 
257, 207 N. W. 207, at 209. The Taylor case merely states 
that if the prosecution desired to punish under the habit-
ual criminal act, prior convictions could be set out in the 
same count of the indictment. Tpis indicates that the 
state has rejected the English rule and lacks any statute 
corresponding to 'Section 105-21-27, Utah Code Annot-
ated, 1943. The Kuwitzky case holds that since the 
habitual criminal act occurs in the chapter on "Criminal 
Procedure'' in the Nebraska code, the trial ·court was 
without power to render a distinct and separate judg-
ment and sentence upon the habitual criminal count of 
the information. The court cites McDonald v. Massa-
dhu.setts, supra, in support of this proposition, neglecting 
altogether the leading case of Graham v. West Virgilnia, 
supra, which flatly holds that a determination as to 
habitual criminality may be made in separate or ancillary 
proceedings. 
The second line of cases which appear to contravene 
the established rule of fairness is illustrated by the case 
of Massey v. United States, 281 F. 293 (1922), which 
holds that under the National Prohibition Act, providing 
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more severe punishments for subsequent offenses than 
for a first offense, and requiring a previous conviction 
to be pleaded in the indictn1ent, it was not error to permit 
the prosecuting attorney to read to the jury an indict-
ment containing an allegation that the accused had been 
previously convicted of a similar crime. This holding 
corresponds to holdings in the state liquor cases and 
Federal Narcotics Law cases. Almost all of these cases 
go off on the theory that the former conviction is a nec-
essary ingredient of the second or subsequent offense, 
i.e., a previous misdemeanor conviction may be a neces-
sary ingredient in a felony charge. This is not the theory 
of habitual criminal laws. Moreover, it is extremely im-
portant to note that even here the only kind of previous 
conviction which may be brought to the attention of the 
jury by means of indictment or information is a convic-
tion of a similar crime. Such evidence might be deemed 
to he of some probative value, in that a person who 
persistently violated the liquor law might properly be 
thought to be more likely to have committed a liquor law 
violation than one whose record in that regard was 
wholly clean. But allegations of former convictions of 
any other sort of crime than one intimately connected 
with the crime at issue would be bad even here. As was 
said in People v. Meisner, et al., (Ill. 1924), 142 N. E. 483: 
''A 1nan cannot be convicted of a crime be-
cause he is a bad man generally or has committed 
other crimes for which he has not been punished, 
tho evidence which tends to prove the offense 
charged is not objectionable because it discloses 
other offenses; the test of admissibility being the 
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connection of the facts proved with the offense 
charged.'' 
Aggravated offenses cases, are, of course, to be en-
tirely distinguiE:~hed from the lines of cases discussed 
above. Under aggravated offenses statutes, a subsequ-
ent act to that for which the accused is being tried may 
be shown to demonstrate wilful intent to do harm at the 
time of the first act. Illustrations of this principle ap-
pear in criminal libel cases-, where libels subsequent to 
that for which the accused is being tried may be put in 
evidence to negative the possibility of mistake, or un-
intentional error. 
SECOND. In a fair trial, the accused has the power 
to elect whether he will refuse to testify on the ground 
of the privilege against self-incrimination or whether he 
will take the stand in his own defense and subject him-
self to the normal rules of cross examination. If the 
defendant elects to pursue the former course, no evidence 
may be introduced with regard to prior convictions, since 
the rule is firmly and universally established that the 
prosecution cannot initally attach the defendant's char-
acter. Whigmore, .cited supra, S. 57; 20 Am. Jur. § 325. 
If the defendant elects to take the stand in his own 
defense, and affirmatively attempts to show his good 
character, the prosecution may in rebuttal offer evidence 
as to his bad character, the reason being that the prosecu-
tion is at liberty to refute the claim of good character 
as it could refute any other claim made by the opposing 
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side. This is not a relaxation of the primary principle. 
"\Vhigmore, cited supra, S. 58. 
But if the defendant merely takes the stand in his 
own defense, without affirn1atively putting his good char-
acter in issue, he is treated as any other witness, and is 
subjec~, on cross examination, to proper questions tend-
ing to shake his credibility. Section 104-49-20, R. S. Utah, 
1933, requires this, that: 
'' * * "' a witness must answer as to the fact 
of his previous convictions for a felony.'' 
And the case of State v. Hougensen, 91 U. 359, 64 P. 
(2d) 229 (1936), has laid down the rules which shall 
govern in the event that a witness is required to answer 
a question as to whether he has ever been convicted of 
a felony, at p. 239 of the opinion: 
''The inquiry n1ust end with the cross ex-
amination, altho not necessarily with the wit-
ness' answer to the particular question put.'' 
Should the witness answer in the affirmative, cumulative 
evidence of the truth of the answer would be ruled out, 
as adding nothing to the truth already established. In-
flammatory matter, prejudicial to the accused in the .eyes 
of the jury, such as rogues' gallery portraits, fingerprint 
cards, and certified records, would then be excluded. 
Should the witness deny that he had formerly been con-
victed of any felony, the prosecution could then proceed 
with proper proof in refutation of the witness' claim. 
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Contrast the procedure actually followed below, 
wherein allegations of previous convictions were read to 
the jury at the commencement of the trial and were con-
sidered as being part of the prosecution's case, to be 
proved before the defense could proc~ed with its evidence. 
Once these allegations and .evidence in support of them 
reached the jury, of what value was the privilege against 
self-incrimination to the accused~ Could he have any-
thing left to lose by exposing himself to attack thru 
taking the stand as, a witness in his own defense~ We 
submit a sneak attack had already been made. Did he 
have any opportunity whatsoever to decide whether he 
would go further, and put his good character in issue~ 
Clearly he did not. By force of circumstances, he found 
himself in a far worse situation than as if he had merely 
become a witness in his own defense, or had gone further 
and put in affirmative evidence of good character. It 
goes without saying that he found himself infinitely worse 
off than as if he had refused to take the stand as a wit-
ness in his own defense, and had he voluntarily assumed 
the risk that the prosecution would interrogate him con-
cerning prior convictions, he would have been assured 
that such evidence of prior convictions, unless he denied 
them, would be limited to a full and frank admission 
on his part. Compare the rt)latively favorable impres-
sion such an admission would make upon a jury with the 
impression to be made by the prosecution's introduction 
of rogue's gallery portraits, fingerprint cards, and certi-
fied copies of court records, which could properly be ad-
mitted only if a witness denied he had ever been con-
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victed of a felony, and perhaps not even then. Would not 
the accused here, by means of the introduction of docu-
ments and photographs highly inflamn1atory in charac-
ter, in fact be placed in the position of having to carry the 
burden of proof of his own good character, under almost 
hopeless conditions, this in addition to the necessity of 
proving he did not comnrit the crime for which he was 
being tried? vV e submit that such was the-4ffect of the 
procedure in the trial court. 
In the instant case, the accused suffered the final 
indignity in being subjected to such a procedure when, 
under the holding of the Walsh case, supra, he could not 
·properly have been deemed an habitual criminal at all, 
in that it appears upon the face of the record that the 
prior convictions alleged and proved as part of the pro-
seen tion 's case did not meet the ''not less than three 
years'' requirement of the habitual criminal act itself! 
In other words, had Section 105-21-27 not been part of 
the statutory law, and if the American and English rules 
-with regard to fairness in the use of evidence did not 
exist, still the allegation of prior crimes and evidence 
thereon could not have been presented to the jury because 
the crimes alleged did not fulfill the requirements of the 
habitual criminal act as a matter of law. 
One may liken the situation to that in which a drop 
of poison is let fall into a glass of water - it may or 
may not be sufficiently virulent to fatally affect a person 
drinking it, but the water is no longer aqua pura, it has 
become poisoned-water, in which two elements have been 
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inextricably mixed.. Should a person drinking this 
poisoned-water die immediately thereafter, one could not 
determine whether he died as a result of drinking the 
water or the poison or merely died coincidentally. But 
in the absence of scientific tests establishing the con-
trary, a reasonable man would think it more likely than 
not that death resulted from the element of poison intro-
duced into the water. So, in the case of fundamental 
unfairness in the use of evidence, one can never be cer-
tain that the ineradicable element .of unfairness has re- · 
suited in a miscarriage of justice, but where the unfair-
ness goes to the heart of the proceeding, a reasonable 
man would think it more likely than not tha~ a verdict 
reached after the potentially fatal element of unfairness 
has been introduced into the proceeding resulted in a 
ver.dict which otherwise would not have been reached. 
·Where such a likelihood exists, due process is absent, and 
the proceeding is a nullity in the eyes of the law. 
PoiNT II. 
IT liS SUBMITT'EID THAT EVEN IF THE PLAINTIFF HAD RE· 
CEiiVEiD A FAIR AND IMPARTitAJL TRIAL ,JN THE COURT 
BIDLOW, NJDV,ER.THEiLESS THE COURT ERJREiD IN FAILING 
TO HOLD THAT THE SENT:E!NCE WAS VOID AND IN FAIL-
ING TO DISOHARGE~ THE PLAINTIFF FROM OUSTODY 
UNDER. THE S.ENiTENCE. 
In the proceedings below, relator was found guilty 
of "robbery and being an habitual criminal,'' and upon 
this verdict the following judgment and sentence were 
rendered: 
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"The judgment. and sentence of this Court 
is that you, Grover Thompson, be confined and im-
prisoned in the State Prison for a te'rm of not less 
than fifteen years. '' 
The jury's verdict of "robbery and being an habitual 
criminal" represents: (1) a determination of fact with 
respect to the allegations of robbery contained in the in-
forinatiou, and (2) a determination of fact as to the iden-
tity of the accused with the person who had been twice 
previously convicted, sentenced, and commited as alleged 
in the information. 
Since the judgment and sentence of the court are 
appropriate under the habitual criminal act, Section 103-
1-18, Rev. Stat. Utah, 1933, but are not appropriate for 
the crin1e of robbery, they depend upon a determination 
as a matter of law that the prior convictions alleged in 
the infonnation satisfy the requirements of the habitual 
criminal act. But since the prior convictions, sentences, 
and commitments were not of "not less than three years 
each,'' as required by the act (State v. Walsh, ___________ _ 
____ [1943] ) , the court was without power to impose 
such a sentence. Nor, obviously, did the court have 
power to impose such a sentence for robbery. This want 
of power appears on the face of the record. 
It is a settled rule that to render a judgment immune 
from attack, the court must have had not only jurisdic-
tion of the subject matter and of the person of the de-
fendant, but must also have had authority to render the 
particular judgment in question~ and if either of these · 
elements is wanting the judgment is fatally defective and 
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open to collateral attack. This is true because jurisdic-
tion to render the sentence imposed is deemed as essential 
to its validity as jurisdiction of the person or subject 
matter. However, mere errors, omissions, or mistakes 
in judgment or sentence render the sentence merely 
voidable, and are correctable only by appeal or by writ 
of error. 
The question to be answered, then, is whether the 
judgment and sentence imposed below are void or merely 
voidable. Cases on this point appear in an exhaustive 
annotation on ''Illegal or Erroneous S-entence as a 
Ground for Habeas Corpus,'' 76 A. L. R. 468-514, follow-
ing the leading case of Lee Lim v. Davis_, 75 U. 245, 284 
P. 323, 76 A. L. R. 461 (1929). This annotation relates 
solely to the question of whether a prisoner may be dis-
charged on habeas ,corpus for errors, defects, or irreg-
ularities appearing on the face of the sentence, the court 
having jurisdiction of the person and subject matter, and 
a valid conviction having been rendered. The cases 
present fact situations which require careful analysis, 
and there is some apparent conflict, altho not a great 
deal. 
We submit that the cases require a determination 
that in the case at bar the court was without p·ower to 
impos·e the sentence it did~ that the sentence is therefore 
void, at least in part, not merely voidable, and that relator 
is entitled to relief from this void sentence. Whether 
relator should be released entirely or whether a correct 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25 
sentence should be in1posed, is not so clear, as will be 
pointed out infra. See 29 C. J. p. 175. 
Let us turn to the cases in which the sentences have 
l1een held void as absolutely unauthorized or of an en-
tirely different character from those authorized by law, 
as, for example, where, on a verdict for a misdemeanor, 
a sentence would be imposed as for a felony, (Ex parte 
Burden, [1907] 92 Miss. 14, 131 Am. St. Rep. 511, 45 So. 
1) or where, upon a conviction for burglary, the court 
would sentence the prisoner to be hanged, (In re Fanton, 
[1898] 55 Neb. 703, 70 Am. St. Rep. 418, 76· N. W. 447). 
In all of these cases, the sentence was held void ab initio, 
altho in some instances steps were taken to impose a 
sentence appropriate to the facts found and in others the 
prisoner obtained eornplete discharge. 
A. Cases in ''hich the prisoner was remanded for proper 
sentence are : 
1. Iu re Hughes (1917) 54 Mont. 153, 167 P. 650. 
There the relator was sentenced to the state prison 
for not less than seventeen nor more than twenty 
years, altho the indeterminate sentence act pro-
vided that the minimum term should not exceed 
one half of the maximum term. The court there 
released the prisoner from the sentence, but held 
that he should be remanded for a proper sentence. 
2. Littlejohn v. SteHs (1905) 123 Ga. 427, 51 S. E. 
390. There the only authorized punishment for 
the offense of the relator was a fine or imprison-
ment but he was sentenced to work on the chain 
gang: It was held that absolute discharge should 
not be given, but that he should be remanded for 
a proper sentence. 
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B. Cases in which prisoner was granted a complete dis-
charge are: 
1. State v. District Ct. (1907) 35 Mont. 321, 89 P. 63. 
Prisoner was convicted of a misdemeanor but 
sentenced to the penitentiary for fourteen years 
as for a felony. It was held that the trial court 
exceeded its jurisdiction in rendering an entirely 
different punishment from that prescribed by 
statute. 
2. State v. Gray (1875), 37 N.J. L. 368, 1 Am. Crim. 
Rep. 554. Relator was sentenced to imprisonment 
at hard labor for six months upon a conviction of 
adultery, whereas the statute pe•rmitted imprison-
ment only. The judgment was held illegal and 
relator discharged since a new judgment could 
not be passed either in that co-qrt or in the court 
below. 
3. Bi
1
ddle v. Thi·ele (1926; C.·C.A. 8th) 11 F. (2d) 235. 
Where ·relator was charged with a second offense 
under the National Prohibition Act but sentenced 
as for a third offense, the sentence was held ex-
cessive and totally void because the excessive por-
tion thereof could not be separated from the legal 
portion. Note, tho, that the discharge was without 
prejudice to the government to take steps toward 
resentence. 
Attention is invited at _this point also to those cases 
in which the sentence was unauthorized because of in-
definiteness and therefor held void and the plaintiff given 
his discha•rge on habeas corpus. See Rasmussen v. Zwn-
del (1926), 67 Utah 456, 248 P. 135, and Lee Lim v. Darvis, 
cited supra. In the Lee Lim case, the petitioner was dis-
charged without prejudice to the rights of the state to 
initiate further appropriate proceedings. 
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In another group of cases, altho the sentence was 
not held void ab initio, or totally void, the plaintiff was 
unifonnly given relief from the illegal part of such sen-
tence. Since this relief was given on collateral attack, 
the sentence was in fact considered partially void and 
given effect only in so far as the power of the court 
extended. In some of these cases, relief was not then 
granted, on the ground that the valid portion had not 
yet been served and plaintiff could not therefo:r com-
plain. H·owever, the courts almost uniformly granted 
plaintiff his discharge when the valid portion had already 
been served, and furthermore, often granted relief in 
the form of a corrected sentence even where the valid 
portion of the sentence had not yet been served. Typical 
of these cases are the following~ in all of which the attack 
was by habeas corpus: 
A. Prisoner discharged after the proper sentences was 
served: 
1. :Munson v. McOlaughry (1912), 42 L.R.A. (N. E.) 
302, 117 C.C.A. 180, 198 F. 72. A prisoner who bad 
served a sentence for burglary with intent to com-
mit larceny was discharged from a sentence for 
larceny which, it was held, the court bad no power 
to impose. 
2. In Re Stewart (1884), 16 Neb. 193, 20 N. W. 255. 
People ex rei Carlstrom v. Eller (1926), 323 Ill. 
28, 153 N. E. 597, 49 A.L.R. 490. Prisoners in 
these cases were wrongfully ~entenced to both 
fine and imP'risonment. They were discharged 
upon payment of the fines. 
3. In re Bolden (1910), 159 Mich. 629, 124 N. W. 548. 
Prisoner was sentenced to prison f'Or a term of 
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from two and one half to eight years, altho the 
legal imprisonment for his crime was imprison-
ment in the county jail for not more than one 
year. Since the prisoner had already served 
about four years, he was given an absolute re-
lease. 
B. Discharge refused until the legal sentence be served: 
1. Reese v. Olsen (1914), 44 U. 318, 139 P. 941. The 
court there had power to impose a fine and im-
prisonment, but went further and alS'o imposed 
a sentence of imprisonment until the fine be paid. 
It was held that since the· legal and illegal terms 
of imprisonment were separable, the p·risoner 
would not be r~leased on habeas corpus until the 
legal term was served. 
2. State v. Ho'oker (1922), 183 N. C. 763, 111 S. E. 
351. Relator was jailed for thirty days and given 
a $200 fine for contempt. It was held he must 
serve the legal part of the sentence: thirty days 
in jail and payment of a $50 fine. 
C. Prisoner remanded for proper senience: 
1. Ex Parte Simmons (1878), 62 Ala. 416. Relator 
was convicted of burglary and sentenced to three 
years at\hard labor. Where such hard labor could 
not prope-rly exceed two years, prisoner was re-
manded for proper sentence. 
2. Com. v. Curry ( 1926), 285 Pa. 289, 132 A. 370. 
Convicted of attempted burlgary, the petitioner 
was improperly sentenced as an habitual offender 
to imprisonment of not less than seven years and 
six n1onths and not more than thirty years. The 
statute applicable to the offe:n.se provided for im-
prisonment not to exceed ten years. The sentence 
was held illegal and the record remanded for a 
proper resentence. 
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D. Sentence corrected or modified and affirmed: 
1. Ex parte Harlan (1909; C. C.), 180 F. 119 (decree 
affirmed in (1910) 218 U. S. 442, 54 L. Ed. 1101, 31 
S. Ct. 44, 21 Ann. Cas. 849). There the prisoner 
was convicted of an offense with a statutory 
punishment of a "penalty'' and imprisonment for 
not more than two years. The sentence conformed 
to the statute as to the penalty and length of im-
prisonment, but imposed imprisonment at "hard 
labor.'' It was held that to the extent of the 
court's excess of jurisdiction the sentence was 
anullity, and the sentence was amended nunc 
pro tunc by expunging the part imposing ''hard 
labor.'' 
E. Proper .sentence imposed, and prisoner remanded: 
1. Haldern1an's Petiti'on (1923), 276 Pa. 1, -119 A. 
735. In that case, the ·court's failure to make the 
sentences on two counts run concurrently caused 
them to run "Cumulatively, thereby making the 
punishment in excess of the ten year penalty au-
thorized by statute. It was he'ld that since the· 
minimu1n sentence rendered was within the ten 
year limit, it was voidable only. The sentence was 
corrected to conform to the statute. 
But compare the following cases: 
A. Harrison v. Moyer (1915; D. C.), 224 F. 224. 
Prisoner was convicted of conspiracy, for which 
the statute provided imprisonment for not over 
two years, but was sentenced to five years under 
a. statute which the trial judge deemed applicable. 
It was held that the error should have been cor-
rected by a writ of error and that habeas corpus 
did not lie. 
B. McElhanev v. Fenton (1927), 115 Neb. 299, 212 
N. W. 612. The prisoner was sentenced to from 
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three to twenty years altho the statute provided 
for a punishment of from one to ten years. It 
was held that the fixing of the sentence was er-
roneous but that it eould have been corrected by 
proper proceedings in error. 
Let us contrast with the foregoing, the cases in which 
the court rejected the elaim of total or partial invalidity. 
These cases involve merely a failure to conform to 
technical statutory requirernents. It is the common and 
outstanding characteristic of these cases that the prisoner 
cannot really claim that he has been harmed, and he is 
therefor not discharged. Typical of. this situation are 
the following cases : 
A. Connella v. Haskell (1907), 87 C. ·C. A. 111, 158 F. 
285. There petitioner was sentenced to five years 
imprisonment for each of two offenses, the terms 
to run concurrently. The statute provided that 
such sentences shall be cumulative. Such irreg-
ularity was held not to ·render the sentence void. 
B. Carter v. :Snook (1928; C. C. A. 5th), 28 F. (2d) 
609. The total of the erroneous sentence did not 
exceed the sum of the sentences which could prop-
erly have been imposed. 
C. Ex Parte Tanner (1929), 219 Ala. 7, 121 So. 423; 
In re Casey (1902), 27 Wash. 686, 68 P. 185. In 
these cases, the judges fixed proper sentences 
where the juries failed in their required duty of 
imposing sentence. 
D. O'Neill v. Jordan (1914), 5 Alaska 81; Re Barton 
(1889), 6 Utah 264, 21 P. 998. In these cases, the 
prisoners were sentenced without their consent 
within six hours after the verdict, contrary to 
statute in this respect. 
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E. Re Hemstreet (1912), 18 Cal. App. 639, 123 P. 984. 
There the justice failed to pronounce judgment 
of sentence within the time fixed by statute. 
F. Ex Parte Beeler (1899), 41 Tex. Crim. Redp. 240, 
53 S. vV. 857. There the clerk inserted a wrong 
nan1e in entering the final judgment of sentence 
in the minutes of the court. 
G. Re Burger ( 1878), 39 Mich. 203. :Mere misnan1ing 
of prisoner where he was sufficiently designated 
to preclude a mistake. 
H. Re \Vinslow (1915), 91 Ohio St. 328, 110 N. E. 539. 
There a burglar was sentenced to remain in prison 
"until discharged by due process of law" when 
the only statute applicable required a sentence 
of from one to fifteen years. 
But compare the following case: 
A. Ex parte Lyde ( 1920), 17 Okla. Crim. Rep. 618, 
191 P. 606. Here the sentence was imposed on the 
defendant in his absence, contrary to statute, and 
the court held the sentence illegal and void, en-
titling relator to his discharge on habeas corpus, 
subject to remand for sentence in accordance with 
his conviction. 
In the case at bar, a sentence was in1posed appropri-
ate to the status of habitual criminality. Such a sentence 
is wholly unauthorized for the crime of robbery nor was 
it authorized upon the pleadings in this case for the 
status of habitual criminality. The irregularity com-
plained of is not merely technical but seriously damages 
the plaintiff and goes to the jurisdiction or power of the 
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court to impose the particular sentence in question. See 
12 R. C. L., pp. 1197, 1209. 
It foHows, then, that one 'Of four results should be 
reached by this court : 
A. The prisoner should be completely discharged; 
B. The prisoner should be discharged from the par-
ticular sentence without prejudice to further pro-
ceedings to enforce the -conviction of robbery; 
·C. The prisoner should be remanded for the imposi-
tion of a valid sentence; ·Or, 
D. The sentence should be modified or corrected by 
this court. 
It is submitted that inasmuch as the prigoner may be 
recommitted for· robbery by legal order or process (Sec-
tion 104-65-22, Rev. Stat. Utah, 1933), justice would be 
done both the prisoner and the state by the adoption of 
the second .course of action. :See also Lee Lim v. Davis, 
cited supra. However, since habeas corpus proceedings 
contemplate disposition of the prisoner according to jus-
tice and the law, we submit that this court has plenary 
power to enter the sentence appropr~ate to the convic-
tion, nunc pro tunc, expunging from the record the void 
sentence imposed by the court below. If the court be 
inclined toward the complete discharge of the relator, 
it has respectable case authority f·or taking such a posi-
tion. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the light of the foregoing argument and authori-
ties, we submit that two questions require a rehearing 
in this case : 
First: Can it be said that relator has enjoyed due 
process of law! We submit that he has not, for these 
reasons: 
A fair and impartial trial is guaranteed every de-
fendant in a criminal proceeding by both state and fed-
eral constitutions. The procedure followed below, per-
mitting the introduction of matters extraneous to the 
case and highly prejudicial in character, rendered the 
relator repugnant to the jury, prevented him from obtain-
ing a fair trial, and deprived him of due process of law. 
A denial of due process results in the complete invalidity 
of the unfair proceedings. V'oid proceedings are sub-
ject to attack on habeas corpus and require the discharge 
of relator, subject to retrial on the question of robbery. 
Second: Can it be said that the court below had 
jurisdiction to impose the .Particular sentence it did upon 
the relator 1 We submit that it did not, for these reasons: 
A judgment and sentence, in order to be immune 
from collateral attack, must be within the power of the 
court to impose. The sentence imposed below was ap-
propriate to the status of habitual criminality, but utterly 
unauthorized for the crime of robbery, the only issue 
presented by the allegations of the pleadings. Such a 
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void sentence is reachable by habeas corpus, and requires 
the discharge of relator, subject to proper steps being 1 
I 
taken to impose a valid sentence. 
The plaintiff submits that the. writ of habeas corpus 
should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DoROTHEA MERRILL DRYER, 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 
Amicus Curiae, by appoint-
ment of the Supreme Court. 
· ... ·· 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
